

Message Text

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43

ACTION SS-15

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FM AMEMBASSY OSLO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 451

INFO AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN

AMCONSUL FRANKFURT

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DEPARTMENT FOR DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER

COPENHAGEN FOR RSO

FRANKFURT FOR RSS

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: ASEC NO

SUBJ: SECURITY PROTECTION AFFORDED PUBLIC ACCESS AREAS AT OVERSEAS
POSTS

REF: STATE 210312

1. AFTER PASSAGE OF TERRORISM ACT EMBASSY BEGAN TO IMPLEMENT
NUMBER OF MEASURES TO IMPROVE DEFENSE AGAINST TERRORIST ATTACK.
FOLLOWING IS LIST OF ACTIONS TAKEN IN CHANCERY:

A) ESTABLISHMENT OF ACCESS CONTROLS AT EACH EMBASSY ENTRANCE
BY USING ELECTRONIC DOOR LOCKS CONTROLLED BY MARINE AND LOCAL
SECURITY GUARDS.

B) PACKAGE INSPECTION.

C) INSTALLATION OF SHATTER RESISTANT FILM ON ALL STREET LEVEL
WINDOWS.

D) IMPROVEMENTS IN INTERNAL ALARM SYSTEMS, ELEVATOR AND STAIRWAY
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DOOR LOCKING SYSTEMS.

E) RELOCATION MARINE SECURITY GUARD DESK AND IMPROVEMENT TO MAIN RECEPTION DESK.

F) DEVELOPMENT OF ACTION PLANS FOR:

- I. BOMB THREATS
- II. INTERNAL DEFENSE AGAINST TERRORIST ATTACK
- III. NEW FIRE PLAN
- IV. PERSONAL SECURITY FOR AMERICAN PERSONNEL.

2. AT OFFICIAL RESIDENCE WE HAVE:

- A) REPLACED OLD WOODEN FENCE AROUND GROUNDS WITH NEW IRON FENCE, BLOCKING SEVERAL HOLES AND OTHER ACCESSWAYS TO GROUNDS.
- B) INSTALLED AUTOMATIC GATE OPENING DEVICES CONTROLLED BY GUARD FROM WITHIN HOUSE.
- C) INSTALLED EXTERNAL CCTV SYSTEM TO SWEEP GROUNDS AND ENTRY WAYS.
- D) EMPLOYED INTERNAL GUARDS.
- E) PUT BARS ON GROUND LEVEL WINDOWS.
- F) INSTALLED ELECTRONIC DOOR LOCKS AND COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM AT ALL ENTRANCES. FOREGOING MEASURES WERE UNDERTAKEN PRIMARILY TO FORESTALL INTRODUCTION OF EXPLOSIVE DEVICES INTO CHANCERY AND RESIDENCE AND TO ACT AS DETERRENTS AGAINST KIDNAPPING OR TERRORIST RAIDS.

3. RECENT EVENTS SUCH AS BAADER MEINHOF ATTACK ON GERMAN EMBASSY IN STOCKHOLM AND TAKING OF HOSTAGES AT KUALA LUMPUR CAUSED US TO INITIATE NEW DISCUSSIONS IN SECURITY WATCH COMMITTEE AND WITH RSO/ COPENHAGEN. AS A RESULT OF THIS PLANNING NEW INTERNAL DEFENSE PLAN WAS WRITTEN AND SEVERAL DRILLS HAVE BEEN HELD TO TRAIN WARDENS AND EMPLOYEES IN HOW TO REACT TO BOMB, FIRE AND TERRORIST ATTACK SITUATIONS. ALSO, SPRINGING FROM THIS EXERCISE, WE HAVE DEVELOPED AND SUBMITTED PROPOSALS (A-166, SEPT 12, 1975, AND A-167, SEPT. 12, 1975) WHICH CALL FOR ADDITIONAL PHYSICAL IMPROVEMENTS DESIGNED TO OVERCOME NEWLY IDENTIFIED WEAKNESSES. BRIEFLY, THESE INCLUDE INSTALLATION OF BULLETPROOF GLASS AND ARMOR PLATE AT MARINE AND LOCAL RECEPTIONIST DESKS AND ON OTHER INTERNAL DOORS LEADING FROM OTHER AREAS OF BUILDING; BLOCKING OF SOME DOORS, INSTALLATION OF NEW DOORS AND REINFORCING OF OTHERS; INSTALLATION OF CCTV AND INTERCOM SYSTEMS FOR BUILDING GUARDS; MODIFICATIONS TO EXISTING ALARM SYSTEMS; AND COMPLETION OF NEW MSG CONTROL CENTER IN LOBBY INNER-COURT (ON ORDER).

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4. OVER THE PAST TWO YEARS I HAVE PARTICIPATED ACTIVELY AT EVERY STEP AS WE DECIDED ON WHAT MEASURES TO TAKE TO IMPROVE OUR SECURITY POSTURE. THE FOLLOWING WOULD APPEAR TO BE OUR PRESENT STRENGTHS:

- A) ESTABLISHMENT OF EFFECTIVE GUARD PROCEDURES AND PLANS TO DEFEND AGAINST TERRORIST INCIDENTS.
- B) REGULAR REVIEW AND DRILL PROCEDURES.
- C) PACKAGE AND VISITOR CONTROL ROUTINES CONDUCTED BY GUARDS AT

EACH ENTRANCE.

- D) CLOSE WORKING RELATIONSHIP AND LIAISON WITH LOCAL POLICE.
- E) IMPROVED PHYSICAL SECURITY IN CHANCERY AND RESIDENCE.

5. OUR WEAKNESSES AT THIS TIME, WHICH WE CAN AND ARE DOING SOMETHING ABOUT, ARE:

A) THE LACK OF EFFECTIVE PHYSICAL DETERRENTS (BULLETPROOF GLASS AND ARMOR PLATING) AT CERTAIN DOORS, STAIRWAY ENTRANCES AND LEADING TO CONTROLLED AREAS OF BUILDING.

B) NEED FOR NEW ALARMS TO SUPPLEMENT EXISTING ALARM SYSTEMS.

C) NEED FOR ELECTRONIC CCTV SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM AND INTERCOMMUNICATION DEVICES AT GUARD POSTS AND ENTRY WAYS.

D) INEFFECTIVE PROTECTION OF PEOPLE AT ENTRY POINTS SUCH AS MARINE GUARD AND RECEPTION DESKS.

6. THERE ARE TWO WEAKNESSES, WHICH REQUIRE FURTHER STUDY. THE FIRST OF THESE IS CAUSED BY INHERENT DESIGN FEATURES OF BUILDING AND ITS LOCATION UP AGAINST SIDEWALKS ON BUSY STREETS. THE SECOND IS OUR PRESENT INABILITY TO OBTAIN GON PERMISSION FOR LOCAL RADIO COMMUNICATION SYSTEM FOR OFFICIAL VEHICLES. BUILDING HAS ABOUT 600 WINDOWS WITH ABOUT 50 OF THESE AT STREET LEVEL, IN CONSULAR, SERVICE AND USIS AREAS. WHILE WINDOW GLASS IS 8 MM THICK AND NOT EASILY BROKEN, LACK OF PERMANENT POLICE STATIONARY PATROL IN FRONT OF BUILDING MAKES POSSIBILITY OF PENETRATION THROUGH CERTAIN OF THESE WINDOWS (PARTICULARLY CONSULAR SECTION) A THREAT THAT CANNOT BE IGNORED. WE ARE THINKING ABOUT THIS PARTICULAR WEAKNESS NOW AND WILL GO INTO IT FURTHER ON NEXT RSO VISIT. AS FOR MOBILE RADIO SYSTEM, WE ARE TOLD THESE SYSTEMS NOT PERMITTED TO FOREIGN EMBASSIES IN WASHINGTON AND IN CIRCUMSTANCE (WHICH IS LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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ALSO AFFECTED BY LACK OF AVAILABLE FREQUENCY CHANNELS), FOREIGN MINISTRY HAS DECLINED PERMISSION FOR EMBASSY TO ACQUIRE THIS CAPABILITY FROM LOCAL SUPPLIERS.

7. AT THIS TIME I WILL BE GRATEFUL FOR YOUR SUPPORT IN HELPING US TO GET QUICK ,CAREFUL REVIEW AND FUNDING FOR RECOMMENDATIONS JUST SUBMITTED TO DEPARTMENT AND FOR SUBSEQUENT RECOMMENDATIONS WE MAY MAKE IN LIGHT OF PARA 3 RECOMMENDATION YOUR REFTEL.
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